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CHAIN-STORE INTEGRATION AS RESTRAINT OF TRADE
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
The defendant A & P grocery chain was charged by the United States with
combining and conspiring to unreasonably restrain interstate commerce in food,
and with entering into and carrying out a conspiracy to monopolize a substantial part of such products in interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman
Act.' The government alleged that A & P, through its vertical and horizontal
integration, used its power to obtain discriminatory prices in supply markets, to
injure competition in retail markets by concentrated price-cutting and lowprofit selling, and to control the sales of fresh produce to its competitors. The
court made no findings as to specific practices, but reviewed the evidence as a
whole and concluded that "though some one or all [of the practices] standing
alone might not amount to a violation of the law, when coupled and inextricably
interwoven with the activities of Acco [the fresh produce subsidiary] [they] reflect inevitably the misuse of defendants' power ..... " Accordingly, the defendants were held guilty as charged. United States v. New York Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co.2

Although Acco's produce market control was pointed out as the decisive evil,
the evidence of A & P's use of its integrated power impressed the court as a
mosaic of predatory and pressure practices. Notwithstanding the evidence that
in some areas A & P may have had monopoly advantages because of the large
percentage of the market it controlled,3 the vertical and horizontal integration
power potential appears to be the basic problem in the A & P case.4 It has been
suggested that basing illegality on specific abuses is probably an indirect way
of talking about the vice of integration.s Integration has appeared before in
Sherman Act litigation.6 In a few cases it has been the sole or principal problem.7
' 26 Stat. 209 (189o), i5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1941).
267 F. Supp. 626, 678 (Ill., 1946).
3 In 1942, A & P's retail sales of $1,444,718,ooo constituted 7.1% of all United States foodstore business. A & P had over 5o of the available business in eight cities, from 40 to 5o% in
fifteen cities, from 30 to 4o% in fifty-one cities, from 20 to 30%fo in fifty-one cities and from
1O to 20% in fifty-five cities. Ibid., at 633. In 1946, A & P's business had grown to over io%
of the trade and $1. 9 billion. The Great A & P, 36 Fortune No. 5, at io3 et seq. (Nov., 1947).
4 A & P has a horizontal integration of 5,751 retail stores, supported by and supporting a
vertical integration of coffee buyers and roasters, milk plants, canneries, bakeries, produce
buyers, breakfast food factories, warehouses, and transportation facilities, all centrally controlled. 67 F. Supp. 626, 633 (Ill., 1946).
5 Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 18o (1947).
6
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. i (1945); United States v. Pullman Co.,
50 F. Supp. 123 (Pa., 1943); United States v. Swift Co., 286 U.S. io6 (1932); United States
v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
254 U.S. 255 (1920); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. io6 (ii9);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (i9ii). ,
7 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 S. Ct. 156o (1947); United States v. General Motors
Corp., 121 F. 2d 376 (C.C.A. 7th, 1941), cert. den. 314 U.S. 618 (i941); Indiana Farmer's
Guide v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
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Two characteristics place integration cases in a class by themselves. One is
that they have aspects of both price agreement-restraint of trade cases and dominating-firm or -firms monopoly cases. The other is that integration is often and
materially anti-small business.
Integration reflects the situation in the restraint of trade-agreement cases
in that it involves a combination of otherwise independent and possibly competitive market units. The law of restraint of trade by price agreement was
cleared of uncertainty in the Socony Vacuum case. 8 Price agreements are unlawful per se. No proof of monopolistic control is required. The rule is justifiable
because the only conceivable purpose of a price agreement is to exercise monopolistic market control. Supply control agreements, usually as boycotts, probably are of the same status. Although they may have a purpose other than
market control, the Court has refused to recognize such other purpose as a defense.9
But integration is like the non-agreement, dominating-firm cases in that the
combination, like the bigness of the single firm, may not have market control as
its sole purpose or effect. Integration, within limits, like bigness, may result
from, and make possible, efficiency. An integrated organization is likely to have
some of the typical size savings of volume, management, and specialization as
well as savings in selling, transportation, and storage between the market levels
of the integration.-' As in the big firm cases, the courts can be expected to balance this socially desirable intent and effect against the possible undesirable aspects. The efficiency argument may weigh less heavily in the integration cases,
however. Efficiency has not as often been associated with inter-unit integration
as with single-unit size."
8 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3o U.S. i5o (i94o).
9 Fashion Originator's Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
zo See note 27 infra. Higher net profits as chains become larger indicate that the size of
chains in general has not passed optimum efficiency. Grocery stores (without meat) are an
exception.
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* Compiled from Federal Trade Commion, Chain Stores, Sales Cost and Profits of Retail
Chains So-55 (x933), in Beckman and Nolan, The Chain Store Problem 57 (x938).

"It is the problem of whether the individual enterpriser is to be rewarded or whether the
reward is to go to those who work only in combination ..... " Levi, op. cit. supra note 5,
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Besides its similarity to the situation where competitive units enter into price
agreements, integration has another general policy against it. In combining
otherwise independent units, the integration effectively places a variety of deterrents on small independent businesses, which are normally and traditionally
in the markets of the integration. The general pattern of A & P's allegedly illegal practices appears to be the use of its power in one part of its integration to
exert pressure on independent rivals in another part. Since the anti-monopoly
policy of the Sherman Act aims at the preservation of opportunities for many
small businesses, as well as the prevention of market price control,12 this consequence of integration is highly important, particularly in the grocery field.
In the recent Yellow Cab case 3 the integration was between cab operating
units and a cab manufacturing unit. The Court neither required nor found monopoly control of either market. It held that because the integration limited the
competitive outlets through which ciabs could be bought and sold in interstate
commerce it violated the Act. The question of whether this limitation effected
market control was not considered. The Court seemed to say that any limiting
of interstate competitive outlets by vertical integration is illegal without more. 4
The Yellow Cab case is unusual, however, in that only a minor part of the allegedly monopolistic cab organization was engaged in interstate commerce. The
integration's slight lessening of competition in this interstate business was apparently primarily used to bring the case within jurisdictional requirements of
the Sherman Act.
at 179 and footnote 128, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, i5 ('945).
"The unit of technological, efficiency in modern economic life is the factory, not the firm.
.... There is a great deal of evidence, in fact, that on the whole Big Business is less efficient,
less progressive technically, and relatively less profitable than smaller business." Rostow,
The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 567, 568
(1947), citing Relative Efficiency of Large, Medium Sized and Small Business, TNEC Mofiograph No. 13 (1941).
"2"Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of
their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve for its own sake and in spite of possible cost,
an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other."
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416,429 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945). "The fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was to secure equality of opportunity and to protect the
public ..... " Charles A. Ramay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of the United States and
Canada, 26o U.S. 501, 5ii (1923). See also the dissent of Justice Brandeis in Liggett v. Lee,
288 U.S. 517, 568 (I933); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (I92o); United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Levi, op. cit. supra note 5, at 154.
1SUnited States v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 S. Ct. i56o (1947).
'4 "By excluding all cab manufacturers other than CCM [the cab manufacturer of the integration] from that part of the market represented by the cab operating companies under
their control the [controllers of the organization] effectively limit the outlets through which
cabs may be sold in interstate commerce. Limitations of that nature have been condemned
time and again as violative of the Act [citing cases]. In addition, by preventing the cab operating companies from purchasing cabs from manufacturers other than CCM, the appellees
deny the opportunity to purchase cabs in free competitive market ..... The fact that these
restraints occur in a vertically integrated enterprise does not necessarily remove the ban of
the Sherman Act." Ibid., at 1564-65.
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The General Motors finance company case 's suggests that harm to independent businesses resulting from the use of an integration's power is a reason for
finding the integration illegal. As in the Yellow Cab case no monopoly market
control by General Motors was found in either the automobile manufacturing
or financing markets, although the Court stressed the "dominant position" of
General Motors. The use of its power as an automobile manufacturer to secure
business for its finance units was in itself found a violation of the Act. Harm to
the independent dealers and independent finance businesses which, because they
were without integration power, were the helpless victims of pressure from another market is apparently the ground for the holding."6 The integration effects
in both the Yellow Cab case and the General Motors case as well as other variations of pressure against non-integrated businesses and freely functioning competition are repeatedly shown in the alleged market practices of the integrated
power of A & P.
One general category of the government's evidence against A & P concerned
its gaining of unjustified price preferences in supply markets. Evidence of this
kind of market control has consistently been emphasized as evidence of monop-

oly.' 7 Since, however, A & P's volume demand is several times that of its largest rivals, 18 it is difficult to determine whether the concessions were because of
volume savings or because of monopoly buying power. If A & P's supply prices
were not competitively justified as against other buyers they are evidence of
non-competitive monopoly control. 9 The government presented evidence purporting to show the gaining of competitively unjustified price preferences
through threats to withdraw patronage from given suppliers or to engage in
1SUnited States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. 2d 376 (C.C.A. 7th, 1941), cert. den.
3r4 U.S. 6r8 (1941).
'6If a combination "arbitrarily uses its power to force weaker competitors out of business
.... it puts a restraint upon interstate commerce." United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 188 Fed. 127, ixr (Del., 19xi). In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
io6 (19i1), integrated control of the various stages in the manufacture of tobacco products
was pointed up as creating "perpetual barriers to the entry of others into the trade;" cf.
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62 (N.Y., 1915).
17United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 S. Ct. i56o(I947); American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 78, (946) (control in tobacco supply auctions); United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 1732 (I944) (supply preference control of movie films); United
States v. Sisal Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. i
(igi) (preferential rail shipping rates); United States v. Pullman Co., 5o F. Supp. 123 (Pa.,
z943) (control over competition entering sleeping car supply market).
'8 In 194r, A & P did almost three times the business of its biggest rival, Safeway; four and

one-half times that of Kroger; eight times that of American Stores; eleven times that of First
National Stores; and sixteen times that of National Tea. United States v. New York Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 633 (I1., 1946). Since 1941, Safeway, a Wall
Street amalgam of smaller chains, has grown. In 1946 its sales were $847 million, almost half
those of A & P. 36 Fortune, op. cit. supra note 3, at

1o3.

See note ii, supra. Competitive markets are those of many sellers and many buyers no
one of whom commands an appreciable fraction of the total supply or demand of the com'9

modity on the market. Rostow, op. cit. supra note 11, at 576; Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition ch. 3-6 (5th ed., 1946).
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competing manufacturing, and the use of elaborate schemes to cover up price
advantages in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. 2 If A & P controls more
demand for a product than the supplier can replace b r lowering his price and
selling to other buyers without decreasing his profit more than if he were to give
in to A & P's demand, then A & P's threat to buy elsewhere will be effective.2
Moreover, A & P's threat to manufacture in competition with the supplier and
"price attractively" if he did not capitulate might also be effective." This threat
may have meant that A & P would sell its own output at a loss, which would be
a comparatively small dent in A & P's total profit, while creating competition
which the much smaller suppliers could not meet for long and remain solvent.
Whether or not the price preferences resulted from legitimate competitive
advantages, they would make price-wise competition by independents with
A &P impossible. Whatever the cause, the outcome is pressure against the independent retail grocer and possibly against the independent supplier. This inevitable detriment to small business may be decisive if there is doubt as to
whether the price preferences are a result of monopoly control.23
There was evidence in the principal case that A & P used the power of its
integration to gain market controls or place independents in a disadvantageous
supply position by other means than direct price preferences.4 A &P's producebuying subsidiary, for example, supplied A & P and also acted as a broker for
other buyers of fresh produce. By thus controlling produce-buying for both
A & P and its competitors, the subsidiary was apparently able to exercise supply control for A & P's advantage. That the court believed the independents to
be at the mercy of the integration is suggested by its finding that the "inconsistent functions" of the subsidiary formed the "rotten thread of the fabric"
0

20 Correspondence among the A &P organization referring to the use of "buying power" was
also emphasized. United States v. New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp.
626 (Ill., 1946).

2"If A & P's national market of the total grocery trade is composed of regular customers
who will take a substitute for a product rather than go to a rival store and if a supplier refuses
to comply with A & P's request, the result may be a smaller total profit at a lower general
price than if the supplier had given A & P a preferential price.
"United States v. New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 638-39
(Ill., 1946). The government claimed that A & P decided that it had reached the optimum
efficiency advantage in its own manufacturing in 1926 but did not make its decision known for
fear of losing a bargaining advantage. Plaintiff's Brief 69, 71 (filed March 2, 1946). A & P's
records for 1927 recite that the time has arrived for making a "demonstration in order to safeguard the arrangements which we now have with national manufacturers ..... [Niational
manufacturers .... will be anxious to keep their arrangements with us attractive so that we
would not consider it necessary to go into their lines." United States v. New York Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 638 (Ill., 1946).
23See

note 12 supra.
States v. New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 655, 678

24United

(Ill., 1946); cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 437 (C.C.A. 2d,
1945). Alcoa consistently sold ingots at so high a price that the "sheet rollers" who were

forced to buy from it could not make a "living profit."

RECENT CASES
running through the entire integration.25 The court did not state that the subsidiary was necessarily supported by a monopoly power or that such power was
necessary to sustain the government's charge. It was apparently sufficient that
the subsidiary, because of its integrated attachment, was able to harm or discriminate against independents who, without integrated attachments, could not
counteract the pressure.
If integrations should entirely take over a marketing system, there would be
no demand and supply markets for the independent, since the market units
which would otherwise comprise them would be tied up in integrations. Market
entry would exist only for other integrations. There is no evidence that this condition is being approached in the grocery field, but if integration is becoming
necessary in order to compete in the markets, it may constitute a threatened
6
danger in the eyes of the court.2
Weighing against the deleterious effects of integration on small businesses
are the efficiency savings of the integration. The integration, however, may not
be thought of as the traditional enterprise which, through mass production,
makes otherwise prohibitive price commodities generally available to consumers. It is usually a combination of small businesses into big business when
the small businesses are generally satisfactory suppliers. Although available
studies show that chain store prices are 5-io per cent lower than independent
prices, the difference may be a transitory one, partially due to monopoly factors.2 7 If efficiency and lower price are to be considered, the traditional preference for opportunity for the small, independent businessman for its own sake
note 16 supra.
at the height of the anti-chain taxing campaign, Senator Brookhart of Iowa said,
"The growth of the chain store is perhaps the most startling development of monopoly in our
country at the present moment." Address before the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, quoted by Beckman and Nolan, The Chain Store Problem 216 (i938).
In igoo, chains accounted for a negligible amount of business. Before the last war they controlled over 307 of all retail trade. Chains covered 25% of the drug trade, 35% of cigar store
business, 40% of the grocery market, 5o% of the shoe business, and over go% of the variety
store business. All but i3% of chain business is controlled by national chains. Census of
Business for 1935, Retail Distribution, Vol. IV, Types of Operation. Urban concentration of
chains was much greater. Grocery chains had over 6o%of the business in Cleveland, Detroit,
and Chicago; about 5o% in Boston, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia; and 40o in
the state of Pennsylvania. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Retail Chains (1937). During the war,
chain percentage of business dropped. In 1943 chain stores did 23.2% of the general retail
business, and grocery chains had 3o.6% of the national grocery trade. Business Week 94
(Dec. i8, 1943). The war forced chains to close some outlets but they plan to add new stores
when it is possible. These will be moderate-size stores, conveniently located to compete with
neighbourhood stores. Business Week 56, 58 (Oct. 28, i944).
A 1937 Fortune survey showed that over half of the people interviewed wanted taxes against
chains high enough to put them on a price parity with independents. In 1939, this majority
fell to 37.3%, who wanted equalizing taxes, plus 6.3% who would have the chains outlawed,
as against 47.7% who were for no special tax. ig Fortune 88 (Feb., 1939).
27 The difference between chain and independent grocery prices according to various studies
is from 5-io%. These investigations included all kinds of stores. The difference between chain
and independent super-markets is probably less. Beckman and Nolan, The Chain Store Problem 6i (1938).
2SSee

2In 193i,
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may, therefore, bear more weight if an integration is in question than if a single
unit is the alleged monopolist.
In A & P's retail selling field the general problem of integration is similar.
Other means of market control are suggested. Whether they are monopolistic or
not, these advantages on the retail level exert pressure on non-integrated small
business. The general tie-up of the horizontal integration on the selling side with
the vertical integration on the buying side, as well as the horizontal integration
itself, point up the A &P organization's advantages over the independent grocer
and supplier and its tendency to eliminate them.
The horizontal selling integration is the great volume outlet that supports the
vertical integration and makes A & P's buying advantages possible.28 In addition the buying end of the integration may operate at practically no profit in
order to supply the selling end with lower-priced goods. Or the selling organization may operate at a very low profit to supply the buying organization with a
greater demand.29 These advantages are not available to non-integrated rivals,

and can be effectively used in gradually subduing small suppliers and retailers
and continuously building up the integration.
There was evidence that the horizontal integration could spread its risk to
the point where it was able to operate with almost no risk cost. 30 This again is

an advantage which an independent, non-integrated retailer does not have and
cannot secure without integrating.
Much of the government's case dealt with specific area price cutting. This
system was used by A & P with its other advantages in a merchandising program to attain given minimum percentages of retail markets. Specific selling
territories were operated at a loss for the purpose of establishing the desired
average volume, and such operations ordinarily proceeded until the purpose was
accomplished.3'
See note 4 supra.
28

29The government argued that A &P's low retail profits were unfair as against independent
retailers. United States v. New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626,
639-40 (Ill., 1946). In I926, on sales of $44o million, the company made a profit of $12 million.
In 1945, on sales three and one-half times as great, it still made only $13 million, a rate of
profits on sales of .9%. 36 Fortune, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1o3.
3o A & P agreed that income from profitable stores offset the losses from unsuccessful stores
and stated that this is one of the incidents of any business operating more than one unit.
United States v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 641-42 (Ill., 1946).
3'Tbid. Plaintiff's Brief 628-986, io88 (filed March 2, 1946). "Underselling .... in certain
territory .... and maintaining a higher level of prices in other localities where competition
is not so keen is a practice condemned by the anti-trust laws ..... " National Nut Co. of California v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76, 81 (1ll., 1945). Loss selling in given areas with the
design of controlling competition first appeared in anti-trust litigation as one of many predatory practices in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. i (Ig1). Loss selling of given
products was emphasized as a restraint of trade in United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. io6 (igii). Since then, area price cutting has been the basis of several consent decrees: United States v. Bowser & Co., i D & J 587 (x915); United States v. American Thread
Co., i D & J 449 (1914); United States v. Central-West Publishing Co., i D & J 359 (1912).
For suggestive common law comparisons see Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., X52 Iowa 618,
132 N.W. 371 (1grr); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, ri9 N.W. 946 (I9o9).
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If a seller can decide how much of a market he wants and get it by systematically reducing the business of competitors, a non-competitive control over
that market is suggested. If such a power is not monopolistic in the market conrol sense, it is in the sense of forcing small independent businesses in general out
of the market. Similar to the non-integrated one-product markets of A & P suppliers, A & P's retail rivals are often non-integrated entities limited to a small
geographic market. As in the case of supply markets, the integrated power of
A & P is undoubtedly often a greater economic potential than an entire given
retail market. And, as in the case of suppliers, A & P can withstand much great32
er losses than its independent rivals in retail markets.
In some areas A & P, by the use of some or all of its integrated power, has
preempted large percentages of the retail grocery markets, reaching over 5o per
cent of the trade in some cities. For practical purposes a grocery market is no
more than city-wide and probably smaller. If size in itself is a violation of the
33
Sherman Act these large market percentages may be illegal per se.
Related to the percentage of control of a city or area market is the factor of
the very limited area monopoly of a single grocery store and the expansion of
this monopoly by the integration of stores in adjoining areas. Since competition
between areas is the only limit on the location monopoly, joining the area units
by integration destroys the limiting factor and increases the monopoly effect in
all areas.
The chain store problem is complicated. It is a problem of choice between
large-scale efficiency and free competition for the small businessman. The chain
system has the economy of an integrated distribution system and dispersed activity. But that economic advantage has provided an instrument readily usable
as a repressive weapon against the independent merchant. The result of American business ingenuity and a progressive business economy has been lower
prices and more goods, but with these developments, retail merchandising is
being wrenched from the hands of independent storekeepers and concentrated
in large centralized organizations. Possible remedies run a gamut of choices.
But the unquestionable dictate which cannot be ignored if Sherman Act policy
is not to be violated is that competitive opportunity must prevail.
32This is obviously true as against independent rivals and small local chains. Loss selling
may not be a means of control against other national chains, however. At Springfield, Missouri,
the defendants contended, A & P failed to succeed and closed its store because of the competition of Safeway. United States v. New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp.
626, 641 (Il., 1946). This suggests that A & P is not a monopolistic power against other big
chains, at least in the retail market. It also suggests that the result may be division of territories among the national chains. Though pressure by the big against the little was the most
devastating evidence against the Big Three in tobacco in American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), the Big Three were not in competition but in collusion.
fl See note 4 supra. The courts will consider control relative to the area or product market
involved. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (x944); Indiana Farmer's
Guide v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 (934); United States v. Terminal R.

Ass'n of St. Louis,

224 U.S. 383 (1912).

